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Within tort law's last two decades, few subjects have bedeviled more
commentators and animated more advocates than has the venerable institution of
punitive damages.' Proponentsof unfettered access to exemplary awards in instances
of egregious misconduct assert that punitive damages are an essential incentive to
important accidentlitigation. Their argument is that without access to such awards, or
with availability limitedby a diversearray oflirnitations,injuredparties seekingjustice
will face an imposing hurdle in securing counsel willing to subsidize the costs
associated with bringing complex litigation.

* CharlesA. Freaueff Professorand Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of
Law.
1. See general& RICHARDA. EpmM, TORTS458 (1999).
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Opponents of punitive damages, whose proposals range fiom damage caps or
restrictive formulae to outright elimination, describe punitive damages as an unruly
doctrinal foundling, capable of outrageous and wanton excess, and incapable of
placement in any traditional tort structure. The distillate of such arguments is that
unmediated punitive damages have no ad valolam effect in accident law, serve no
progressive contemporary tort objective, preserve the specter of ungoverned
overdeterrence, and "appear to be an anomaly, a hybrid in search of a rationale."*
This Essayreviews the commonlaw matrix in whichpunitive damageshave been
placed and the current availabilityof such awards in the several states. It continuesby
discussing the two most conspicuous doctrinal evaluative tools: (1) Corrective
JusticelMorality;and (2) Economic Efficiency, examining the value of each of these
in responding to avoidable and tortious harm. The Essay describes why neither
corrective justice nor efficiency provides a satisfactory rationale for imposition of
punitive damages. However, and perhaps ironically, these very limitations form part
ofthe rationale for the availability of exemplary awards against actors whose conduct
is extreme.
This Essay then treats the United States SupremeCourt's substantialandrepeated
recent forays into the subject, includingit's gloss on the DueProcess, ExcessiveFines,
and Review Clauses. In conclusion, this Essay asserts that the independentbut related
state legislativeand SupremeCourt efforts to domesticatepunitive damageshave been
largelysuccessfulin creating a favorable, albeitungainly, fair, and rational position for
punitive damages.
11. EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES,
ACCIDENT
LAW,AND TORTNORMS

A. A Classical Treatment of Remediesfor Accidental Injuries
At early common law, an injury or loss having its immediate and uninterrupted
cause attributable to the direct application of force by another could trigger an
indemnificatoryobligationin the actor. The earliesttort remedy for money reparations
was made available to those sufferinginjury to their person or property caused by the
actors' intentional (althoughnot criminallymalicious) and direct application~fforce.~
As so many accidental injuries involved causal sequences in which temporal or other
variablesrelegatedthe actor's conductto amoreremote, but still causallypremier role,
the orthodoxtrespass restriction operatedto deny many worthy claimants of aremedy,
while leaving an equivalentnumber ofwrongdoersundeterredfiom continuationofthe

2. Marc Galanter& David Luban,Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages andlegal Pluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1393,1393 (1993).
3. See generally C.H.S. FIFOOT,
HISTORYAND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND
Comc1'44 (1949). "Mayhem and battery were at first claimed as the ancestors of Trespass, but a
later preference has been indicated for robbery, as suggestive both of trespass to the person and of
trespass to goods." Id. (citations omitted).
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risk-elevating conductPEnglishcourts thereforecreatedleaveto petition for aremedy
termedUtrespassonthe specialcase," permittingan action-by-action evaluati~n.~
Thus,
in actionsinUspecialcase," recovery was permittedto those injuredinmoreelaborate
causal sequences, such as when the actor's dereliction put into motion, or left
uncorrected, a force or a circumstancethatwouldlater cause the claimantharm or loss.
The nomenclature "trespass on the special caseyyadequately described courts'
amenability to examine the particular circumstances of a loss to determine if
compensationwasjust. Put anotherway, as alargeproportion of such suits arosefiom
scenarios in which the injury was occasioned by the actor's careless, rather than
deliberate(thoughnotpurposefbllyharmfbl) actions, actions inWspecial
caseyy
created
aremedyinmonetaryliabilityfor the multitude of actions in which the injury arosenot
by the actor's direct application of force, but rather by a sequence of causal factors.
Courts limitedthis enlargementoftort liabilityby addingthe requirement that save
in limited circumstances,6 the plaintiffs prima facie case needed proof that the
defendantnot only causedtheinjury, but that he was also in some degree at fault? This
cause of action therefore accommodated a more nuanced causation proof, but at the
same time, it elevated the plaintiffs burden by requiring a showing of fault. Thus, the
standard developed was the direct precursor to negligence liability.
The negligenceregimen,with important sculptingin theproducts liabilitydomain
and elsewhere,has withstood time's test as alargelyadequateset ofrules for ordering
liability and risk reduction in the modem marketplace. As tort doctrine serves as a
moral and cultural bellwether of social expectations, values, and objectives, the
negligence rules governingor at leastinfluencingaccident law generally, andproducts
liabilityinparticular,haveprovided asturdy legalproxy for this nation's sentimentthat
reducing avoidable injuries inures to the public welfare.

B. Remediesfor More Aggravated Tortious Misconduct
Early on, however, it was recognized that the law of neghgence was only capable
ofrespondingto "offthe shelf"examplesof substandard conductand consequentharm.
Its optimal suitability was effectuating justice between the injured plaintiff and the
negligent tortfeasor, by providing indemnification for the plaintiffs proved loss, and
reinstating, insofar as money damages could do so, the plaintiff in the position he
enjoyed prior to the harm.

4. Commentators often noted the trespass doctrine's incapacity to provide a remedy for the
accident in which the defendant, who was constructing a home along a road, accidentally left a beam
of wood in the road, which hours later causedtheplaintiff s nocturnal carriage accident However, the
"action on the case" cause of action allowed the court to examine such a situation to make an
individualized determinationof liability.
5. SeegenerallyF~OOT,supranote 4, at 66-92 (using the heading "The Development ofActions
on the Case").
6 . For example, liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defamation.
7. Brovm v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); see ROBERT
L. RABIN,PERSPECTIVES
ON
TORTLAW14 n.2 (4th ed. 1995).
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What, though, of particularly egregious conduct? Was a more draconian
mechanism appropriate or necessary to respond to a defendant whose conduct
exceeded ordinaryignorant or incautious carelessness, and could insteadbe described
as wilfil, wanton, or evenpurposefid? Ought there not be apunishment(albeit civil)
that was more severe for the actor whose conductwas more outrageous and willful than
that of the actor whose tort might be nothing more than an unknowing mistake?
The common law recognized that such aggravated misconductwarranted a more
vigorous tort remedy for application by the civil justice system. Such a response, it
followed, must necessarily go beyond ordinary indemnification and impose additional
penaltiesthat would serve to punish the actor, to make an example ofhim, and to more
publicly pronounceeto others that such conduct was intolerable.
Frederick Pollack noted that the nineteenth century "English lawyy
typography of
"Personal Wrongs," which included "[wlrongs affecting safety and ikeedom of the
person," contemplated a type of wrong that was "willful or wanton."' According to
Pollack, such a special or aggravatedwrong was either "intended to do harm, or, being
an act evidently likely to cause harm [and] is done with reckless indifference to what
may befall by reason of it."9 In the context of intentional torts, Pollack's
characterizationhearkened ofthe same outrageousness that isnoted today as sufficient
to stimulate community outrage. Pollack concluded that such wrongs where "there is
[either] deliberate injury, or there is something like the self-seeking indulgence of
passion, in contempt of another man's rights and dignity," ought be considered not
only "legal wrongs" but also wrongs that are properly "the subject of strong moral
c~ndemnation."'~
The approach of justice administered with an eye towards such "public
condemnation" is a primary tenet of the modem law ofpunitive damages, as embraced
in one form or another in the majority of American jurisdictions. The laws of Great
Britain, where punitive damages were founded, provides punitive damage awards for
particular forms and qualities of risk-creating behavior. Civil Justice Rule 7 0 )
provides: "Damages are essentially compensatory innature. In certain circumstances
damagesmay not be compensatory." The commentaryto the rule explains, in pertinent
part: "Damages may be contemptuous, nominal, exemplary or (aggravated) punitive."
In research collectedby Professors Khan, Robson, and Smith,' one learns that British
tribunals award "exemplary" damages "to teach the defendant a lesson," including
circumstances in which "the defendant's conduct has been calculatedby him to make
a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the
~laimant."'~

'

8. FREDERICK
POLLACK,
THELAWOF TORTS:A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF OBLIGATIONS
ARISING FROM CIVILWRONGS
IN THE COMMONLAW
9 (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 2d ed. 1890).
9. Id. In this regard, Pollack's classification was, concededly, confined to the intentional torts of
"[a]ssault, battery, false imprisonment." Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 9. He concludes in language explicit in its Greco Roman and Judeo-Christian affinities,
"If anyone desires to be satisfied of this, he may open Homer or the Psalter at random." Id.
11. MALCOLM KHANETAL., CLINICAL
NEGLIGENCE
(2d ed. 2002)
12. Id. at 290-291.
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Whether it is realistic to attribute to punitive damages success in achieving the
goals of punishment, and deterrence, has been questioned by at least two arguments.
First, punitive damages will not necessarily punish the wrongdoer, who will simply
internalizethe cost by raising the prices of its goods or services and pass them along
to the consumer. Second, the insurer's duty to defend and duty to indemnify under the
conventional Comprehensive General Liability Policy transfers both the cost of
litigation and the responsibilityto pay damagesto the defendant's insurance carrier.I3
As to the argument that the cost of anyjudgment will simply be passed along to
the consumer, a Wisconsin appellate court explained that this attempt at expediency
would not be invariably available to the defendant in a vehicular design lawsuit:
It does not follow under economic logic that a punitive damage
award will be passed on in whole or in part as a cost of doing
business. It may or may not, dependingupon Ford's price standing
inrelationto its competitors andits own financial condition. It could
meanlower profitsforFord It couldresult in stockholdercomplaints
about a lowerprofit margin because ofpunitive damage awards for
unsafe cars, thereby spurring Ford on to exercise more care in the
safe design of its automobiles. It couldresult in a greater scrutinyby
Ford's management ofits auto designfromthesafety standpoint.All
ofthese changes, with the exception of lowerprofits or higher costs,
ifthey were to take place, would benefit the public as a whole.14
Regarding the second potential that insurance would vitiate any punitive impact of
such a\vards, many states provide that insurance against punitive damages is void as
inconsistent with public p~licy.'~

A. Generally
Skepticism about the value, governability, or both of exemplary damages has
been debated among academicians since the nineteenth century.16 Some
commentatorsfocused on the perceived incongruitybetween the exemplary damage
13. Thisnomenclaturedoesnotdistorttherecognitionthatpunitivedamagesarenotrectificatory
orindemnificatory, as suchgoalsaresatisfiedthroughtheawardof compensatorydamages. Rather, the
indemnification described here, should itbe available, is the insurancecanier's duty to indemnify the
insured for the payment of anyjudgement, even though, in the ordinary course of such transactions, it
is not the actor that satisfies the judgment to the successfbl plaintiff, but rather the canier.
14. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294N.W.2d437,452 (Wis. 1980) (quoting from Judge Barland
in Barager v. Ford Motor Co., 293 N.W.2d 924 (Wis. 1980)).
15. See, e.g.,NorthwesternNat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307F.2d432,442 (5thCir. 1962) (finding
that 'public policy forbids an insurer and an insured to enter into an insurance contract covering
punitive damages"); see generally DAN B. DOBBS,LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
336 n.6 (2d ed. 1993) (collecting authority).
16. mohm H. KOENIG
&MICHAEL
L. RUSTAD,
INDEFENSE
OF TORTS
LAW41 (200 1).
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penalty as inconsistent with tort law's compensatory goal, even going so far as to
suggest that punitive damage awards should escheat to the state."
In our modem setting, the final verdict on the value ofpunitive damages certainly
must be interpretedthrough the societal expectations ofpersonal integrity and general
welfare as expressed through the law of torts. Over time, accident law has developed
distinctive liability doctrines with the dual objectives of deterring risk-elevating
behavior and encouraging more societally beneficial conduct. In pursuing these
objectives, the Corrective JusticeIMorality (Corrective Justice)18 approach and the
Law and Economics~Economic
Efficiency (Economic Efficiency)lgapproacheshave
dramatically affected legal education and scholarship as well as the common law and
statutory development of the law governing money damages for accidental injuries.
B. Corrective JusticdMorality

The older of the two principal approaches is commonly termed Corrective
Justice, and its influential group of scholars hew to the position that the on& and
still primary goal of tort law, including the law of products liability, is righting
wrongs caused by tortious behavior. With its strong overlay of moral obligation, and
the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the Corrective Justice approach
posits that tort law's principal raison d 'itre is to return parties suffering physical
injury or property damage due to another's tortious conduct to the status quo ante, at
least insofar as money damages can so d~.'~Notwithstandingthe occasionalargument
of the Economic Efficiency supporters which herald that efficiencyprecepts explain
most purely the deterrence effects of tort liability rules, a corollary to the Corrective
Justice thesis has always been that in addition to its rectificatory goal, the Corrective
Justice model also advances the societal objective of reducing the occurrence of

17. Id.
18. See generally Robert E. Litan et al., The US.Liability System: Background and Trends, in
LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVESAND POLICY 1 (Robert E.Litan & Clifford Winston eds. 1988).
Injuriespose three different and potentially conflicting challenges for all societies.
One is efficiently to deter behavior that causes injuries. A second and related
objective is to exactretribution against thoseresponsible.. ..The third challenge
is to compensatevictims for their injuries. . ..Tort la+mles allowing accident
victims to seek compensation through the judicial system from the parties
responsible-can be considered a mechanism for meeting all three of these
challenges.
Id. at 3.
19. See generally RICHARD
A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF LAW(3d ed. 1986).
FOUNDATIONS
OF
20. Jules L.Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
TORTLAW 53 (David G. Owen ed. 1995). "[Clorrective justice is the principle that those who are
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law
embodiesthis conceptionofcorrectivejustice."Id.;see Gary T. Schwartz,Mixed Theoriesof TortLaw:
Afirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX.L. REV.1801 (1997). "Currently there are
two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the
goal of deterrence, commonly explainedwithin the frameworkofeconomics.Theother looks at tort law
as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties." Id.
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similar wrongs in the future?'

C. Economic Eflciency
The more recently developed approach is one of Economic Efficiency, an
evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the appropriate measure of the success or
failure of any law, including tort law, ought to proceed under an economic analysis.
Ordinary economic rationales have also described the role of compensatory damages
as an effective means of discouraging substandard or risk-creating conduct injuring
an unconsenting third party and thus bypassing the market. It is better, theoretically
at least, to pressure the actor into bargainingwith any willing and knowing person for
the right to expose him to a riskU
The conspicuous deterrence objective ofpunitive damages is seeminglyendorsed
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts' standard that exemplary damages should be
"awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him fiom similar conduct in the futue."" The deterrence objective
ofpunitive damages is so strong that some authority exists for the appropriateness of
awards even when the actor has died, on the theory that even in the absence of a
punishment dedicated to a living person, such an award is warranted in that it will
deter other similarly situated living actors from pursuing the same course of conduct.
It plausibly can be arguedthat the availability ofpunitive damages is anecessary,
but not by itself sufEcient, component to discourage wanton harmful conduct. As to
the arguable necessity of such damages in some form, there is a continued value for
punitive damages, be they in mediated or unrnediated form. Put another way, the
imposition of conventional CorrectiveJustice measures, resulting upon proper proof
in the compensation of the plaintiff for his proved loss, will concededly instill some
hesitance in the actor to perpetuate the same conduct again. However, the majority
of states continue to conclude that more than simple compensatory damages is
necessary to discourage misbehavior at its extreme. Thus, for example, in the
influential decision handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wangen v.
21. The correctivejustice objective of deterrenceis evidenced in scholarly writings dating back
to thenineteenthcentury.In 1890, one academicauthorwroteaboutthegoalsofthenegligenceaction:
"Thereally importantmatter is to adjust the disputebetweenthepartiesby amleof conductwhichshall
do justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the
community, and tend to prevent like accidents from happening in [the] future." William Schofield,
Davies v. M a w Theory of ContributoryNegligence,3 HARV.L.REV.263,269 (1890); accordBarrett
v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304,308 (Ct. App. 1990). The Barrett court commented further that
by choosing not to limit the measure of damages, "California has chosen 'to strengthenthe deterrent
aspect of the civil sanction: "the sting of unlimited recovery ...more effectively penalize[s] the
culpable defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated fiom such future conduct"' ...rather
than to protect defendantsfrom excessive financialburdens." Id. at 308 (alterationin original) (citations
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,291 (Ct.App. 1985) (stating one
principal purpose of strict liability was "to provide an economic incentive for improved product
safety").
22. Today one cannot help but think of the newest "trash" TV shows "Fear Factor" and "The
Chair" and derivatives thereof.
(SECOND)
OF TORTS8 908 (1979).
23. RESTATE~~ENT
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FordMotor C O . ,Ford
~ ~ argued that the magnitude ofpotential compensatory damages
in a serious injury case was itself sufficient incentive to the bringing of lawsuits to
redress injuries.'' The court responded that Ford was only partly correct and that
punitive damages were a necessary gear in the machinery of tort law incentives for
a large number of actions that might not otherwise be filed.26The court wrote that
"Ford may be right [that the prospect of significant compensatory damages will
provide sufficientincentive for the bringing of claims] where injuries are very severe,
but it is probably wrong . . . where injuries are moderate or minor."27 The court
buttressed its conclusion that punitive damages may be appropriate in such latter
instances by proposing that "even if the injury to each individual is not severe, there
is a public need to deter the production of unreasonably [unlsafe products, and the
availability ofpunitivedamages increases the likelihood that the injured customerwill
sue for recovery."28
It is difficult to maintain that simple responsibility in indemnification sends a
strong message to others similarly situated to discontinue such egregious conduct,
particularly in circumstances in which the actual penalty may be incurred not by the
actor, but rather by its insurance carrier. Additionally, simple compensatory awards
fail to satisfy the long recognized, if not uniformly respected, community wish to
make an example of those whose conduct has gone beyond simple carelessness into
the realm of wantonness and its fellow traveler, immorality.
Additionally, while the Economic Efficiency model for tort liability may provide
an adequate rationale for compensatory damages, its inherent limitations point to the
need for the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages. The Economic Efficiency
approach to explaining ordinary compensatory damage awards has been illustrated
by Judge Posner, enlisting the law of battery-the common law rule concerning
liability for harmful or offensive touching. Quite apart fiom the Corrective Justice,
morality, and fairness attributes of tort law for battery, the law and economics
argument is that the doctrine should "dete[r] persons fiorn engaging in activities that
a reasonable person would view ahead of time to be socially ~asteful.'"~Posner
illustrates this proposition with the decision in Garratt v. Daile~.~'Garratt is
remembered as the case in which the five-year-old Dailey pulled away the lawn chair
as his, until that point, affectionate aunt was in the process of sitting down.31
Proponents of the Economic Efficiencymodel would argue that tort liability in battery
would serve the efficiency objective, irrespective of whether Dailey received any
psychological or material benefit from the act. If the harm to his aunt exceeded any
benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian analysis would support the imposition of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
PosN
30.
31.

294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
Id. at 441
Id. at 448.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452-53.
See JAMESA. HENDERON,
JR.ET AL., THE TORTSPROCESS29 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing
E R ,note
~ ~ 19,
~ ~at~206-1 1.
279 P.2d 109 1 (Wash. 1955).
Id. at 1092.
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liability. On the other hand, if Dailey derived benefits that exceeded any physical or
emotional injury to his aunt, pulling the chair out was wasteful or inefficient. Why
wasteful? Becausethe transaction-the act and the harm-without the aunt's consent
could generate sizeable accident costs, not the least of the costs being substantial
litigation costs. In Posner's words, such torts
involve. ..a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant in a setting
of low transaction costs. Such conduct is inefficient because it
violates the principle that where market transaction costs are low,
people shouldbe required to use the market ifthey can and to desist
fiom the conduct ifthey can't?*

Thus,in this simplifiedparadigm of the application of the efficiencymodel to the
loss serves as a proxy for the calculation of what
classic tort of battery,s£in'atpil
waste or avoidable accident costs the defendant's inefficientconduct has occasioned.
However, the mere description of the efficiency rationale betrays its incapacity to
satisfactorilydeal with risk-creatingbehavior of the most extreme type. An award of
compensatory damages, be it thought of in t e r n of simple Corrective Justice or as
a proxy for accident costs incurred by the defendant's inefficient behavior, meets its
limitation in settings involving extreme conduct characteristic of punitive damages.
Economic Efficiency proponents assert that the actor is properly punished for failing
to resort to the market to seek contractualauthorizationfor his conduct. However, the
existence of a market for such agreement predicates this assumption. Persons do, of
course, bargain away degrees of safety-witness the popularity ofthrill rides at theme
parks and the accompanying purported waivers of liability. Yet, in the context of
willful, wanton, or deliieraterisk-creatingbehavior, which often translates into injury,
severe or othenvise, to many persons, one is unlikely to find any lucid person or
group of persons prepared to bargain away their relative safety.

N.MODERN
LEG IS LA^ CONTROL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SUPERVISION
A. Generally
Modem legislative reform has taken several approaches. To name only a few,
many jurisdictions require that punitive damages may be awarded only on proof by
"clear and convincing evidence'' of the defal~ation.3~
Three states allow the jury to
determine the availability of punitive damages, but place the decision as to the
amount of the award in the hands of the c0urt.3~Other initiatives to limit jury
32. POSNER,
supra note 19, at 208.
5 549.20(1)(a) (West2000)(applying the "clearand convincing"
33. See, eg.,~&w.STAT.ANN.
s u p1,rat464a
standard). The several variations of state law reform are summarized a t E ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ,note
65.
34. CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 5 52-240b (West 1991); KAN.STAT.ANN.5 60-3701(a) (1991); OHIO
REV. CODE.ANN. 5 2307.80@3) (Anderson 200 1); see generallyDAVIDG. OWEN,
M. STUARTMADDEN
& MARY J. DAVIS,
2 ADDEN EN & O i m ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 4 18:6 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
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discretion in punitive damages decisions include confining such awards to multiples
of the compensatory damages awarded.35
To moderate the phenomenon of punitive damages, a remarkably interested
Supreme Court has accepted the invitation to examine state punitive damages law
under the lenses of the Due Process, the Excessive Fines, and theNo Review Clauses.

B. The Supreme Court's Intervention

In three influential decisions between 1991 and 1996 the Supreme Court
answered important questions about the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process limitationson the prerogatives of state courtjuries to award punitive damages.
In these three decisions, PaciJic Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ha~lip:~IXO
Productions Cop. v. Alliance Resources C ~ r p . :and
~ BMWof North America, Inc.
v. Gore.:' the Court established that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause would be violated if exemplary awards were
imposed pursuant to reasonably intelligiblejury instructions, upheld on the basis of
rational standards, and were not "clearly excessive."
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatheman Tool Group, Inc.:' the Court, in the
context of its three prior holdings, squared the box by establishing the standard for
federal appellate courts reviewing punitive awards.40The Cooper Court held that a
combination of due process, jury function, and trial and appellate court expertise
considerations commended de novo review of jury punitive damage j~dgements.~~
Although both the majority42and the dissenting43opinions conceded that the issue
might have more philosophical effect than practical consequence, members of the
defense and the plaintiffs' bar have suggested that the decision exhibits the Court's
pro-business orientation. Regardless, Cooper stands as a marvelous tutorial in the role
of punitive damage awards in American civil litigati~n.~~
The Supreme Court has visited core punitive damage issues with a devotion
accorded few other constitutional issues, and with an emphasis, at least prior to
Cooper, upon substantive due process limitations that should be imposed upon jury
MADDEN& OWEN ON PRODUCTSLIABILITY] (discussing legislative reform pertaining to punitive
damages).
35. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.ANN.5 13-21-102(1)(a)(West 1997) (stating punitive damages
may not exceed compensatory damages); see ako MADDEN& OWENONPRODUCISLIABIL~,
supra
note 36, $18:6, at308 (listing states withstatutory cap onpunitivedamages such as Comecticut,North
Dakota and Texas (two times compensatory damages); Florida and Nevada (three times); Maryland
legislative proposal (four times); and New Jersey (greater of five times or $350,000)).
36. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
37. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
38. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
39. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 437-40.
42. Id. at 441.
43. Id. at 448 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. There is much evidence that the bark of potential punitive damage liability is greater than its
bite, but that examination is beyond present purposes.

Heinonline - - 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1184 2001-2002

discretion in such awards. In the first of the three most important of these decisions,
PaciJic Muhcal Life Insurance Co. v. Ha~lip:~the Court desaiied such awards as
performing a "quasi-criminal"46function intended as "private fines"47that would
punish the defendant and deter future lvrongfhl c~nduct.~'In Haslip, the Court
considered an Alabama jury's punitive damages award of $800,000 that had been
rendered against an insurance agent and his employer for the agent's fraud in
collecting and keeping insurancepremiums even after the plaintiffs' policies hadbeen
cancelled49The award was approximately four times the plainti&' proved loss?O
Examining the award against the backdrop of Alabamajury instructions, and in view
of that state's established standards for appellate review of exemplary awards, the
Court stated that while the award might be "close to the [constitutional] line," it was
not so large as to violate due process?' The Court paid particular attention to that
jurisdiction's three levels of procedural safeguards: jury instructions, post-verdict
The jury's instructions afforded
review by the trial court, and appellate revie~v?~
"significanf' but not "unlimited" discretion, in that they set forth the purposes for
such awards-deterrence and punishments3 Similarly, the Court found the postverdict review procedure sufficientbecause trial courts were required "to reflect in the
record the reasons for interfering with the a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on
grounds of excessiveness of the damage^."'^ Finally, it considered the appellate
review which, pursuant to decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, required
consideration of numerous factors relating to the relationship between the
compensatory and the punitive awards, the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the profitability of the conduct, and the defendant's h c i a l position."
In TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources
the Court &ed
a
$10 million punitive damages award following trial of a dispute over oil and gas
development rights in West Virgi~ia.'~IIXO had sought a declaratory judgment
regarding the rights, following which Allied brought a counterclaim for slander of
title?' Finding in favor ofAlliance, thejury had awarded $19,000 in actual damage^.'^
Applying a '&ossly excessive" standard, the Court took particular note of TXO's
misconduct, and wrote:
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47.
(1974)).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350

Id. at 19.
Id. at 4 7 .
Hmlip, 499 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 19-23.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20-22.
509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 451.
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[We] do not consider the dramatic disparity between actual
damages and the punitive award controlling in a case of this
character. On this record, thejury may reasonably have determined
that petitioner set out on a malicious and hudulent course to win
back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream of royalties that
it had ceded to Alliance. The punitive damages in this case [are]
certainly large, but in light of the money potentially at stake, the
bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme employed in this case
was part of a larger pattern of h u d , trickery and deceit, and
petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was so
"grossly excessive" as to be beyond the power of the states to
allow.60

BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore:' evolved fiom plaintiffs damage action
which he brought upon learning that his vehicle, purchased as "new," had actually
been partially repainted after being damaged in transit by acid rain6' The jury
awardedhim $4,000 in compensatory damages, and $4 millioninpunitive damages!3
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2 million.64The United
States Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that a state may employ
punitive damages to punish and deter miscond~ct!~Then, reiterating a "grossly
excessive" standard of review, the Court continued: "Only when an award can fairly
be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."66The Court held that a principal flaw in the Gore verdict was that the
evidence admitted and considered by thejury had included each of the approximately
1000 instances in which BMW had sold such similarly repaired vehicles nationwide,
including sales in states @ which such sales violated no consumer protection laws.67
The reach of the verdict contemplated the erroneously-perceived interests of other
states, potentially violating interstate comity that could "infiing[e] on the policy
choices of other state^."^' Thus, the Supreme Court found that when only Alabama's
punishment and deterrence interests were taken into account, the $2 million award
was "clearly exce~sive."~~
The Gore Court continued by i d e n m g three guideposts
for determining if a punitive award was ccgrosslyexcessive": (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the reasonableness of the
relationship (the "ratio") of the punitive award to the compensatory award, and (3) a
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Id. at 462.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 568 (citing TXO Prods. Gorp., 509 U.S. at 456).
Gore, 517 U.S. at 570-72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574.
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comparisonwith the other civil and criminal penalties imposed or authorized in such
cases?'
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatheman Tool Group., Inc?l involved two
manufacturers of multifhction hand tools, both seeking to improve the venerable
Swiss army
Leatherman's tool enjoyed the dominant market position at the
time Cooper undertook to introduce its new product.73In the course of promoting its
new product, but before commencing its actual production and sale, Cooper used in
its advertising materials photographs of a modification of the Leatherman pr0duct.7~
Leatherman filed trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising
claims under the Lanham
and common law claims of unfair c~mpetition?~
The
jury awarded $50,000 in actual damages and entered a $4.5 million punitive damage
verdict as well?7 The trial court rejected Cooper's post-trial claims that the punitive
damage award was "grossly exce~sive,"~~
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
a&med the punitive damages award, finding that the trial court hadnot "abuse[d] its
discretion in declining to reduce the amo~nt.'"~
The SupremeCourt grantedcertiorari onthe single issue ofwhetherthe appellate
court's application of an "abuse of discretion" standard in its review was proper, as
contrastedwith review on a de novo basis?' Reversing and remanding, the Court held
that in matters of appellate review of punitive damage awards, federal appeals courts
should employ de novo review?' In so doing, the Court principally focused on three
considerations: (1) the departure ofpunitive damage awards fiom ordinary "findings
of fact" associated with awards of compensatory damages; (2) the respective
capacities of the trial and appellate courts to apply the indicia established in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore.;82and (3) the virtues of appellate court de novo review
in the achievement of a semblance of uniformity and predictability in allowable
exemplary damage a ~ ~ a r d s ? ~

70. Id. at 574-75; see generally 2 MADDEN& O

~ ONNPRODUC~S
LIABILITY,
supra note 36,

5 18:7, at324-25 (using Gore as aprimary example for instructing courts on how to use dueprocess to
strike down excessive punitive damages awards).
71. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
72. Id. at 427.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 15 U.S.C. 5 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
76. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 428.
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id.
79. Id. at43 1 (quoting Cooperhdus., Inc. v. LeathermanTool Group, hc.,No. CV-96-1346-MA,
1999 IVL 1216844, at **2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
83. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 431-42.
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I . Exemplary Awards Dzfer From Compensatory Damage Findings of
Fact
The Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause "controls the allocation of
authority to review verdicts"84and provides that "no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law."8s It has been accepted generally that the Re-examination Clause
is not violated by appellate review applying a deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard." Central to the Court's analysis in Cooper was its conclusion that punitive
damage awards differ fkom ordinary jury findings of fact, and therefore may be
subject to appellatereview without the constraints of the Re-examination Clause.'' In
the Court's words, "[u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents
a question of historical or predictive fact, . . . the level of punitive damages is not
really a 'fact' 'tried' by thejury."" Rather, in the Court's view, awards of exemplary
damages are "expression[s] of . . . moral condemnationy7intended to "punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future oc~urrence."'~
2. Respective Trial and Appellate Court Capacity

While the "Jury Trial" and Re-examination Clauses make essential obeisances
to the trial court's superior position in evaluating what proof is to be admitted into
evidence and whether sufficient support exists for conventional findings of fact, the
Court's conclusionthat awards of exemplary damages do not constituteconventional
findings of fact invited it to consider which vantage point-that of the trial court or
that of the appellate court-was superior for application of the Gore factors. If the
appeals courts were better able to apply the Gore factors, such a conclusion would
bolster the argument that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review would be less
warranted, and hence more support for de novo review by the appeals court.
Taking the Gore factors seriatim, the Court conceded that as to the first Gore
factor requiring consideration of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the trial courts "have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals,"
but added "that the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on
witness credibility and demeanor."g0
As to the second Gore factor, relating to "the disparity between the harm (or
potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award," the Court
84. Gasperini v. Ctr.for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,432 (1996).
85. U.S. CONST.amend. VII.
86. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437-40.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at440. ContrasttheevaluationofJustice Ginsberg, who states thatregardingthe first Gore
in dictum the trial courts "have anundeniablysuperior vantage over courts of appeal"inevaluatingthe
first criterion, that ofthe reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, insofar as the trial court views the
evidence not as reflected in a "cold paper record" but rather "in the living courtroom context." Id. at
445,448 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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determinedthat "[tlrial courts and appellatecourts seem equally capable of analyzing
the second factor.'*' Lastly, the third factor's call for considerationof "the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases" called, in the Court's view, "for a broad legal
comparison . . . more suited to the expertise of appellate courts."92 Taken in the
aggregate, the majority concluded that "[c]onsiderations of institutional competence
therefore fail to tip the balance in favor of [the] deferential[clearly erroneousstandard
of) revie~v."~~
3. The Value of Uniformityand Predictability
The Court also highlighted the objectives of bringing uniformity and
predictability to review of exemplary damage awards. It stated that "[ilndependent
review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to
clanfy, the legal principle^."^^ Quoting Justice Breyer's concurrence in Gore, the
Court emphasized that "[rlequiring the application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens notice of what
actions might subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law
4. Justice Ginsberg 3 Dissent

The gravamen of Mrs. Justice Ginsberg's dissent was that the majority erred in
finding that awards of punitive damages were not "findings of fact" within the reach
of the Re-examination Clause. Adopting the majority's language that a telling
characteristic of findings of fact is their character as "historical or predictive fact,"
Justice Ginsberg conceded that exemplary awards involved a panoply of
considerati~ns?~
However, she continued by urging that while punitive awards
differed fiom compensatory awards in the cluster of considerations that make up the
jury verdict, the differencewas a matter of degree and not of kindg7"[Tlhere can be
no question that a jury's verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
determinations we characterize as factfindings," she wrote, using as examples "the
extent of harm or potential harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the
defendant acted in good faith' whether the misconduct was an individual instance or
part of abroaderpattem, [and] whether the defendantbehavednegligently,recklessly,
Justice Ginsburgassertedthatthe inexact relationbetweenan award
or mali~iously."~~
of punitive damages and a compensatory damage award should not vitiate the

91. Id. at 441.
92. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 441.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 436.
95. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
96. Id. at 446 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S.at 446.
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underlying reality that each is tethered to jury findings of fact. Using noneconomic
damages (usually pain and suffering) as a basis for comparison, Justice Ginsberg
suggested that "[olne million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a
'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral outrage.
Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as determined by a jury. If
one set of quantification is properly regarded as factfinding, it seems to me that the
other should be so regarded as well."99
5.

What WillBe The Impact of Cooper?

In anticipatory humility, the Cooper majority concurred with the dissent in
admitting that the redefined appellaterole of de novo review "will affect the result of
the Gore analysis in only a relatively small number of cases[,]"100and thus there is
reason to surmise that the impact of Cooper will not materially change the quantity
of punitive damage awards handed down by juries, nor the quantum of the individual
awards. Federal trial courtjudges now have years of experience in applyingthe Gore
factors, and there has been no indicationthat they have failed to execute the Supreme
Court's charge in that decision as faithfully as they must any other instruction from
the Court, including the gratuitously minimized trial court capacity to evaluate "the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'y101
It is delicious, nonetheless, to speculatewhether the trial bar will develop special
interrogatoriesforjurors in exemplary award cases in an effort to provide a fact-based
underpinning that could move a court to conclude that the award of exemplary
damages was indeed a conclusion based upon "historic or predictive fact," and thus
akin to conventional compensatory damage awards suited to "clearly erroneous,"
rather than de novo, review.

An irony of punitive damages is that the tort remedy intended as a prophylaxis
for conduct so aggravatedas to require extraordinary, noncompensatorymeasures for
its containment will itself continue to prompt vigorous state and constitutional law
restraints-a modem genie in the bottle. While abolishing punitive damages
altogether remains an option to state legislatures, most states will almost certainly
continue to preserve exemplary awards for truly outrageous conduct as a necessary
instrument in correcting the under-deterrence of ordinary compensatory damages. At
the same time, states can be expected to experiment with various f o b of limitations,
or develop new ones, to ameliorate the claimed overdeterrence risks of broad jury
discretion in the entry of such awards.

99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. 121 S. Ct. at 1688.
101. Id. at440.
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The Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses importantlyh e the boundaries
ofpermissibleawards in terms that hearken to conventionalfairness goals of remedies
for avoidable accidents. The Haslip, TXO,Gore, and Cooper decisions establish the
Supreme Court's position that while constitutionally lawhl, important substantive
restrictions and mechanisms for the consistent application of those restrictions are
necessary dimensions of the continued application of exemplary awards. In essence,
the Supreme Court has imposed a constitutional requirement that punitive damage
awards will only pass constitutionalmuster after successful passage through several
fairness checkpoints.
In tort law's lengthy development of governing liability for causing injurious and
avoidable accidents, it has been a truism that common law causes of actions and
remedies have developed by accretion, with new remedies or limitations advanced
upon the presentation of new facts, developing societal expectations, or both. At the
same time, state legislatures have not balked at the task of sculpting or placing
limitations upon such judicially-created remedies. In no area of tort law is the
influence of state legislative and United States constitutional collaboration more
focused than in the law of exemplary damages. In a petrie dish in which the these
creative and restrictive agents alike have been introduced, each mod@mg, retarding,
or enhancingthe other, will be witnessed the continuing evolution of our modem law
of punitive damages.
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